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Some proposals for the solution 
of the Carnap-Popper discussion 
on 'inductive logic' (*) 
1. The explicata (1). 
The explicata for 'degree of confirmation (corroboration)' proposed by 
Carnap and Popper may be described as follows: 
a. Carnap's c-function is, as he defines himself, the relative logical 
probability of a hypothesis h, given an evidence e. 
c (h, e) = m (h, e) 
or, more generally 
c (h, e) = P (h, e) 
b. Popper's a-functions (as his E-functions) in their not-relativised 
formulation are relations between the absolute and the relative logical pro-
bability of the hypothesis h, given an evidence e. Perhaps one wonders at 
this. Indeed, Popper is continually defining his a- and E-functions in terms 
of the absolute and the relative logical probability of an evidence e, given 
a hypothesis h. However from his definitions 
E (h, e) 
a (h, e) 
a' (h, e) 
P (e, h) - P ( e) 
P (e,h) + P (e) 
E (h, e) [1 + P (h) P (h, e)] 
P (e, h) - P (e) 
P (e, h) + P (e) - P (e. h) 
(*) The author wish to thank in the first place Prof. L. Apostel and also Prof. E. Ver-
meersch for interesting discussions and critical remarks on the subject matter of this 
article. 
(1) The most systematic explanation of the c-function can be found in Carnap's 
Probability, Carnap's actual views however do no more completely coincide with the 
contents of this book. For Popper's E- and C-functions see e. g. his Logic. 
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it is easily to prove that 
P (h, e) - P (h) 
P (h, e) + P (h) 
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E (h, e) 
C (h, e) 
[P (h, e) - P (h)] (1 + P (h) P (h, e)] 
[P (h, e) + P (h)] 
P (h, e) - P (h) 
C' (h, e) 
P (h, e) + P (h) - P (h, e) P (h) 
It is even more clear that the alternative E-function 
E (h ) = P (e, h) 
1 ,e P (e) 
can be written as 
P (h, e) 
E1 (h, e) = P (h) 
This E-function will be no more examined in this article, because this 
E-function does not seem to allow to define an elegant C1 (h, e) (2). 
2. Disadventages of the explicata. 
Both explicata have two striking groups of 'disadvantages'. 
a. Carnap's c-function leads to the paradoxical implication that a hy-
pothesis h may be disconfirmed by a given evidence e, while an other hy-
pothesis h' may be confirmed by the same e, and that nevertheless c (h', e) > 
c (h, e). This disadvantage is noted by Popper (3) and proceeds from the 
fact, that the absolute logical probability of a hypothesis may have de-
cisive influence on his relative logical probability, and hence on his c-value. 
The second group of disadvantages of Carnap's explicatum consists of a set 
of consequences from the properties of almost-L-true and almost-L-false 
sentences. 
b. The first group of disadvantages of Popper's_ C-functions is a counter-
part of the first group of Carnap's, and proce~ds from the fact, that the C-
values of hypotheses are in many cases not influenced at aU by the absolute 
probability of these hypotheses. So it seems intuitively desirable to ac-
cept that a disjunction of two well-corroborated hypotheses is higher cor:... 
roborated than each of these hypotheses taken apart. A gambler will pre-
(2) The function C1 (h, e) = E1 (h, e) [ 1 + P (h) P (h, e)] which may be defined from 
the last E-function, is ranging from 0 to + 00, and provides the value 1 + p2 (h) for 
neutral evidence (P (h) = P (h, e)). 
(3) Popper: Logic, pp. 390 ff. 
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fer to bet at a given ratio on two possible outcomes rather than to bet at 
the same ratio on one of them only, and a doctor will prefer to count with as 
many hypotheses as possible in curing a dying patient. If they followed 
Popper'sC-functions, they would find an other result, because in most 
cases (see below) C (h, e) > C (h V h', e) < C (h', e). The second group of 
disadvantages of the C-function rises from the property: 
C (h, h) = 1 - P (h). 
This leads to the unacceptable result that a confirmed hypothesis is 
always corroborated to a higher degree than a lot of less general, but veri-
fied (and hence true) hypotheses. 
In this article will be argued: 
a. that two different explicanda are confounded in the intuitive 'degree 
of confirmation', and that the first group of disadvantages of the c-
function as well as the first group of disadvantages of the C-functions 
are necessary properties of the different explicanda, which the explicata 
are trying to seize. 
b. that the second group of disadvantages of the c-function are disadvan-
tages that may not be repaired by the (qualified-) instance-confirmation 
nor by Hintikka's a-parameter, but that are perfectly repaired by Ke-
meny's proposal (asymptotic values). 
c. that the second group of disadvantages of the C-function are genuine 
disadvantages which are confusion-bearing and which may not be re-
paired at all. To overcome this, an alternative function (the K-function 
will be proposed. 
3. Rejection of deductivism. 
The comparison of Carnap's and Popper's proposals becomes much sim-
pler, if deductivism is rejected and if all factual knowledge up to a given 
time is used as evidence in calculating C-values. As there are indeed argu-
ments against deductivism, it appears preferable to start with these. 
3.1 In Popper's proposal (4) to calculate C-values, aprioristic arguments 
are involved. 
Indeed the calculation of values of P (e) cannot be based on merely de-
ductive arguments, but is only possible by a (necessary aprioristic) choice 
of a distribution of absolute logical probabilities. 
3.2 Popper's metric is not general enough to calculate C-values. 
(4) Popper: Logic, pp. 410 ff. 
8 D. BATENS 
In Popper's text only a method for calculating E-values is given. In-
deed there is not mentioned how P (h) and P (h, e) may be determined, and 
to determine them is necessary for arriving at C-values. Here in turn an 
aprioristic factor has to be introduced. 
Let it be mentioned, that even the calculation of P (e, h), which Popper 
seems to present as determined by the merely analytic probability calculus, 
is not always possible in this way. If for example the hypothesis is a dis-
junction of statistical hypotheses (5), then the absolute probabilities of the 
single hypotheses that compose the disjunction, must be determined. 
These problems rise a fortiori, if different hypotheses are compared. 
3.3 Popper's metric for absolute probabilities partly coincides with Car-
nap's m*. 
Popper takes a 'Laplacian distribution' for determining P (e). The cal-
culation of P (e, h) for him is purely deductive (6). 
It is clear that, starting from Carnap's system of state-descriptions, a 
statistical hypothesis, or a statistical report about observed facts, turns out 
to be a structure-description (or a disjunction of structure-descriptions). 
If m* (7) is choosen, then we arrive at the same result as Popper with his 
metric. . Indeed m * (8) gives equal weights to structure-descriptions. 
3.4 Popper's argument based on Bernouilli's 'law of great numbers' leads 
to results opposed to his own theory. 
Popper is using neither the evidence e as such nor a statistical report of 
it, say e', but a disjunction of statistical hypotheses, say e*. This however 
is contrary to Popper's very valuable requirements concerning precision (9). 
The following elements play a part in the argument where Popper uses 
Bernouilli's law. 
a. P (e~, h) = p 1 
The PI must be nearly to 1, in order to make [P (e~, hI) - P (e~)] 
great. 
(5) Such hypotheses are : 
(x) [ p (R (x» ~ r] 
(x) (y) [ R (x) ~ [ r ~ p (8 (x» ~ s.]] wherein p denotes an objective probability. 
(6) As explained above this cannot be always the case. 
(7) To-day m * is no more defended by Carnap, because it is clearly inadequate for 
Carnap's ends, cfr. Carnap & Stegmiiller: Inductive, pp. 251-252. 
(8) m* attributes the same probability to structure-descriptions. 
(9) If a sample has a width n, m elements have the property A and min = r, then the 
statistic report is : nr elements out of the sample (with width n) are A. Popper however 
does not use nr but n ( r ± k), in order to apply Bernouilli's law. 
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b. e~: n (r + k) individuals of the sample (with size n) have a given 
property A. The lower the value of k, the lower that of P (e~) and 
hence, the higher that of [P (e~, hl) - P (e~)l. 
Suppose: 
hl : r « 1) of the individuals of the universe are A. 
e' (the statistical report) : nr individuals of the sample are A. 
Clearly hl is the hypothesis which is most 'confirmed' or 'corrobora-
ted' bye'. 
Now suppose: 
h2 : s « 1) of the individuals of the universe are A. 
e; : n (s ± l) individuals of the sample (with size n) are A. 
(s + l) > r> (s - l) 
Clearly, it is possible to choose such a s and a l, that: 
P (e;, h2) = P2 = Pl 
l=k 
and consequently: 
[P (e~, hl) - P (eDl = [P (e;, h2) - P (e;)] 
This means that, if neither e nor e' but a e* is used, then it depends on 
the particular choice of the e*, which hypothesis may reach the highest 
C-value. 
There is no logical reason to choose a disjunction of statistical reports 
rather than another. Indeed 
n (r + it) > nr > n (r - k) 
n (s + I) > nr > n (s - l) 
and hence 
e' ::) e~ 
e' ::) e; 
As there is no logical reason to prefer a disjunction of reports, rather than 
another such disjunction, there is no reason to prefer one of the (in principle 
i;nfinite number of) hypotheses which may reach the highest C-value. This 
leads to the acceptance of a disjunction of hypotheses instead of to the 
acceptance of a more precise hypothesis. 
On the other hand, if Popper uses the report as such or even the report 
in its statistical form, it can be proved that, even for the most ideal e', 
P (e', h) will decrease with the increasing width of the sample. 
This conclusion is not catastrophic for the C-function because, if the 
report itself or if the statistical form is used, P (e, h) orP (e', h) will decrease, 
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but much slower than P (e) or P (e') will do. Hence the E- and C-values 
may increase, if the size of the sample grows. This however underlines the 
importance of the choice of an a priori distribution. 
3.5 The argument concerning dependence, which Popper uses against m* 
makes defect. 
As Popper notes, the laws of the abstract probability-calculus must 
stay in inductive logic. He argues, that the independence of single events 
does not hold, if Carnap's m*-function is accepted. This arises from a con-
fusion. 
What is meant by the logical independence in the abstract calculus is 
that, given a definite distribution, the fact that an event took place does 
not influence the probability of an other event. Now this holds very well 
in Carnap's system for all m-functions of the A-continuum. 
Suppose we are tossing a die. To say that a definite outcome does not 
influence the probability of the outcome of the following throw, means 
that, given the true distribution (depending on properties of the die), the 
objective probability of some outcome or other of the following throw, 
stays the same, and namely, the objective probability determined by the 
distribution. If in Carnap's system the distribution (a structure-descrip-
tion or a disjunction of structure-descriptions) is given, say d, only then 
the logical probability-value c (h, d) corresponds with the objective proba-
bility of h, and is independent of the forgoing outcomes. If however one does 
not know the true objective distribution, but has only a report e of out-
comes of preceding tosses, then c (h, e) has only to determine a logical pro-
bability. This logical probability may depend on preceding outcomes, 
even if the objective probability does not. 
3.6 Burne's argument holds against m+ (10) as against m*. 
Each regular m-function has the property set forth in 3.5. On the other 
hand, each such m-function states a definite dependence (one of them being 
independence) . 
However there seems not to be any logical reason for choosing one of 
them, and hence every particular choice is aprioristic. Consequently Hu-
me's argument may be used alike against each particular choice. 
3.7 An inductive m-function is needed in order to reach adequate C-func-
tions. 
Let h be a hypothesis about only future facts. If m+ is choosen, then 
always: 
P (h) = P (h, e) 
(10) m+ attributes the same probabilities to all state-descriptions. 
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consequently 
C (h, e) = 0 
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This means that the hypothesis is not 'corroborated' at all bye, whatever 
it may be. Hence the C-function leads not to acceptable results, if m + 
is choosen. 
An analogous inacceptable result holds even for hypotheses describing 
the whole universe (and not only the not observed part). Take a lot of hy-
potheses which assert that what took place, had to be taken place, and 
which assert further whatever about the future. All of these hypotheses, 
which have a same absolute probability, have also a same C-value, and the 
C-values differ only in as much as the absolute probabilities differ. 
So for example, let e be: 'the hundred up to now observed individuals 
had property R', let hI be: 'all individuals have the property R', and let 
h2 be: 'the first hundred individuals have the property R, all the others 
the property R'. 
Clearly: 
m+ (hI) m+ (h2) 
c+ (hI,e) = c+ (h2, e) 
hence it follows 
This example also demonstrates that an inductive m-function is needed 
to arrive at adequate C-values. 
Popper may argue, that such hypotheses may not be choosen. This 
rule is not deductively founded and hence, even if m+ was merely deduc-
tive, what it is not, Popper would need aprioristic rules in order to reach 
adequate C-values. 
3.8 What was criticised before, was the more 'logical' aspect of deducti-
vism, i. e. the thesis that science proceeds by a merely deductive method 
of testing. Another aspect of deductivism is the requirement that only 
observations, which took place after the formulation of the hypothesis, 
may be used as evidence. However once the logical aspect is rej ected, no 
serious arguments in favour of the second aspect seem to stay. 
Furthermore, the second aspect may be criticised on his own. So for 
example, it does not seem acceptable at all, that a hypothesis should have 
a lower value, only because it was formulated later. Such arguments are 
in favour of the supposition, that Popper defends the second aspect of de-
ductivism only in order to safe the 'logical' one. 
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Whatever may be, Popper's C-functions and many of his opinions may 
be very usefull, even if deductivism is rejected. This last point will become 
clearer below. 
4. The intuitive explicanda: confl and conf2 
The two explicanda that are involved in the intuitive concept of 'degree 
of confirmation' would be the following. 
a. confI: an explicandum concerning degrees of certainty. Suppose one 
is asserting that a definite well-limited sociological hypothesis, which 
is supported by a set of factual materials, is better confirmed than an 
other sociological hypothesis which is also supported by factual ma-
terials, but which is so general, that the evidence is surely not to be 
regarded as conclusive. Here the intuitive 'better confirmed' stands 
for an expression about certainty. 
However, there are other cases where such expressions can hardly 
be translated in terms of confirmation. So it seems paradoxical to 
speak about 'a priori degrees of certainty' as about degrees of confirma-
tion. E. g. it sounds contra-intuitive to say that, if we know nothing 
about the planet Mars, except the fact that it exists, then the sentence 
'there are living beings on Mars' should be confirmed to a degree of 1/5. 
The same holds, ascribing degrees of confirmation to predictions about 
singular events; e.g. : the sentence 'the outcome of the following throw 
with this die will be a six' is confirmed to a degree of 1 /7. The reason 
that these and analogous expressions sound contra-intuitive depends 
on the way one's intuition is confounding the two confirmation con-
cepts. In areas where both have the same properties the two are used 
at the same time, in other areas only one of them is used. Consequently 
the contradictory word-usage does not become shown, before exact ex-
plicata are constructed. 
b. conf2' This explicandum is dominated by a classifying viewpoint: the 
fact that a hypothesis may be confirmed, neutrally confirmed or dis-
confirmed. Starting from this, the concept is made comparative in this 
way, that one hypothesis is said to be more confirmed than another, 
if it is 'more supported by facts', whatever the a priori degrees of cer-
tainty of these hypothesis may be. Consequently, disconfirmed hypotheses 
always have a lower conf2-value than confirmed ones, and a hypothesis, 
whose low (actual) confI-value is caused by its Iowa priori confI-value, 
may have an higher conf2-value than another hypothesis with higher 
confI-value. 
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This confirmation-concept is viewed if one says, that (universal and 
very general) physical theories to-day are more confirmed than most 
(very narrow) psychological ones, even if these have only a numerically 
limited application field. Here also, the confusion with the other ex-
plicandum produces a number of paradoxical results, e.g. concerning 
the conf2-value of disjunctions of hypotheses. 
Now probabilities will be examined. The first explicandum can clearly 
be reconstructed as a (relative) logical probability. An explicatum for conf2 
has to be relation between the absolute logical probability of hypotheses 
and their relative ones, given an evidence. That conf2 of hI' given eI , is 
greater than conf2 of h2' given e2, means indeed that the probability of 
hI is more increased by el than the probability of h2 is by e2. 'More in-
creased' means that the 'distance' between P (hJ and P (hI' eI ) is greater 
than that between P (h2) and P (h2' e2). 
It is not difficult to understand why one's intuition confounds both ex-
plicanda. If the number of observed instances, which are permitted by a 
hypothesis, increases, the values of both confl and conf2 increase also. 
If hypotheses with the same 'a priori confI-value' are compared, both ex-
plicanda are introducing the same order. Misled by such cases, one's in-
tuition identifies two concepts, which lead to very different results in other 
areas. 
As the reader has already understood, the author of this article is holding 
that Carnap's c-function is an explicatum for confl and Popper' a-func-
tions explicata for conf2' Indeed Carnap's c-function is defined as a relative 
probability function (interpreted as a logical relative probability), while 
Popper's a-functions can, as was noted in a previous section, be defined 
as relations between absolute and relative (logical) probabilities. 
Now there is much material which is worked out formerly and which 
can be used in favour of the value of Carnap's function as explicatum for 
the intuitive concept confI; e. g. what is worked out concerning rational 
betting-quotients. The situation is different in case of Popper's a-func-
tions. There are many possible definable relations between absolute and 
relative probabilities and it is not immediately clear which of them may be 
a good explicatum for conf2 or, which of them is a good explicatum for conf2 
and at the same time has a value as an instrument for scientific work. 
5. About the possible usefulness of the explicata. 
The last point of the preceeding section is very important. Just because 
of the confusion in one's intuition, intuitive explicanda can only be used 
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as inspirative sources in constructing more or less useful, exact explicata. 
Consequently, a more important problem is, to answer what instruments 
are needed in science. Both Carnap and Popper will be in accord, that only 
this answer can be decisive in evaluating their proposals; both indeed agree, 
and in recent times they formulated this very explicitly, on the only rela-
tive power of intuitive argumentations and evaluations. 
The thesis to be set forth here is, roughly said, the following. Carnap is 
searching for an evaluating system which will be useful to decision making 
in applied science (as medicine, engineering, a. s. 0.). Let us call such sys-
tems PC-systems. Popper, on the other hand, is searching for the analo-
gous for theoretical science. Let us call such systems TC-systems. 
For practical decisions (where science is applied) one needs knowledge 
about the certainty of hypotheses. On the other hand, for deciding on the 
choice of a hypothesis in theoretical science, one needs knowledge about 
the content of hypotheses and about the certainty we have, with respect to 
that cont~nt (to the absolute probabilities of the hypotheses). 
Once we accept an a priori distribution for logical probabilities (a m-func-
tion), there can be little doubt that Carnap's c-function determines to what 
extent we may be certain about a hypothesis. In other words there may be 
little doubt that the c-function determines what we are justified to bet on 
the hypothesis. Surely it is clear that hypotheses, which have a high ab-
solute probability, even if they are disconfirmed (in both senses) may ne-
vertheless have a higher PC-value (relative probability) than confirmed 
hypotheses with lower absolute probability. This even has to be the case 
since a fair betting function is intended. 
What is needed in applied science is just this. Surely also problems of utility 
playa part here, but they depend for a great deal on probabilities or degrees 
of certainty. Everywhere, the practical scientist is in search of increasing cer-
tainty as far as possible. In planning a bridge, the engineer calculates it so, 
that theoretically his construction should be able to withstand a higher 
weight than necessary. The same holds in cosmonautics etc. From this 
point of view the, first group of disadvantages of the c-function disappears. 
The relation between contI' PC-functions and Carnap's c-function does 
not seem to need much discussion; below one will find more evidence to 
assume the c-function as a good PC-function. 
Popper's a-functions on the other hand can clearly not be used as PC-
functions; a-values of confirmed hypotheses are always higher than those 
of disconfirmed ones, irrespective of the relative probability of the hypothe-
ses. If a-functions were nevertheless interpreted as PC-functions, this 
would lead to the paradoxes described in section 2. as the first group of 
'disadvantages' of Popper's a-functions. 
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Now TC-functions will be considered. The theoretical scientist likes to 
formulate hypotheses which are very general, i. e. which have a high con-
tent, and hence low absolute logical probability. There is no doubt that 
this old thesis of Popper's is right. It should however not be forgotten, that 
science likes hypotheses, which have not only high content, but which are 
also well supported by factual evidence. Thus, in evaluating hypotheses 
from a theoretical point of view, a scientist should look both at content and 
at relative probability; if an adequate explicatum is possible here, it must 
be defined as a relation between the absolute probability of hypotheses and 
their relative probability, with respect to an evidence. 
As noted in section 1., Popper's C-function is such a relation. There must 
however be taken care; there are different kinds of relations between ab-
solute and relative probabilities, which may have importance for decisions 
in theoretical science. In the light of what is worked out in this article two 
kinds of relations seem important. 
Let the first kind be denoted as TCa-functions. These are functions which 
express how worthy a hypothesis is to be accepted, given its content and its 
relative probability. Such functions must have at least the following pro-
perties: 
a. with respect to tautological evidence, hypotheses with a higher content 
must receive a higher value, 
b. the same must hold for verified hypotheses, 
c. the value of a hypothesis must increase, if the relative probability of the 
hypothesis increases, and decrease, if the relative probability decreases. 
It is clear, that the C-functions cannot be TCa-functions; indeed they 
have the property 
C (h, t) = 0 (t = tautology) 
and so, they do not fulfill condition a. In section 7. other properties of 
the C-function will be found that are contradictory with desiderata for 
TCa-functions. 
Let TCb functions be a second kind of relations between absolute and 
relative probabilities. These functions only denote 'confirmation' -aspects. 
They denote what is the value of hypotheses with respect to their being 
supported by facts, i. e. with respect to the measure in which their logical 
probability is increased or lowered. TCa-functions were at the same time 
judging the content and the' confirmation '-value. TCb-functions on the 
other hand only express how valuable a hypothesis is made by observed 
facts, which have altered the relative probability of the hypothesis. TCb-
functions say nothing about the content of the hypothesis in a direct way. 
16 D. BATENS 
Suppose a scientist says: 'this hypothesis is very well supported by facts 
but it has little scientific value, while it is so narrow'. The first part of this 
sentence is typically a TCb-expression, meaning that the probability of the 
hypothesis is much increased by facts. The second part says, that never-
theless the hypothesis has an absolute probability which is too high, and 
hence a content which is too low to be a scientifically important hypothesis. 
TCb-expressions only take into account the question whether the proba-
bility of a hypothesis is incrased or lowered. However, in doing this, the 
content factor reappears, but only indirectly. Indeed, the sentence 'the 
probability of a hypothesis hI is more increased than that of an other one 
h2 " means that the 'distance' between P (hJ and P (hI' e) is greater than 
the distance between P (h2) and P (h2' e); the distance however cannot 
be measured adequately by merily distracting one probability from the 
other, but must necessarily be a relative distance, and namely relative to 
the value of the absolute (or of the relative) probabilities. Consequently 
TCb-functions build a well-limited class of relations between absolute and 
relative probabilities. 
The TCb-functions must have property c. of the TCa-functions, but for 
all hypotheses the a priori values (i. e. the values with respect to tautolo-
gical evidence) must be identical; the analogous must hold for the values of 
verified hypotheses. Indeed, the fact that these values should depend on 
the content of the hypotheses, would not only be superfluous, but also very 
misleading. It should be remarked that all these properties fit very well 
with conf2' whereas the properties of TCa-functions clearly do not. 
Popper's a-functions make defect as TCb-functions because of 
a (h, h) = P (h) 
At the same time they have the property 
a (h, t) = 0 
and a lot of other ones (see below), which are necessary or at least compa-
tible with their being TCb-functions; so for example, the first group of 
, disadvantages' of the a-functions are necessary properties of TCb-func-
tions. 
It needs not be remarked that Carnap's c-function cannot be a TCb-
function (nor evidently a TCa-function). In defending Carnap's c-function 
against Popper's attacks, Bar-Hillel argued (11), that the scientist (clearly 
the theoretician) is searching theories with high c-values (relative to the 
evidence of that time), and with low absolute logical probability. 
(11) Bar-Hillel: Comments, p. 156. 
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Against this can be objected, that it is always possible to choose a h2 
such that 
c (hI V h2' e) > c (hI' e) 
and thus Bar-Hillel's argument is missing a point. This indeed leads to 
the search for an adequate TCa-function, which Carnap's is not. There. 
should however also be noted, that the c-function is not a TCb-function 
Theoretical scientists search for theories whose relative probability is much 
increased with respect to their absolute probability (hence theories with 
high TCb-values), and not theories that have high c-values (all hypotheses 
of e. g. physics have indeed the c-value zero). In this respect Popper's 
criticism is well founded. 
This objection should be made against Bar-Hillel as well as against 
Kemeny, where he writes (12), that Carnap is interested in " ... the deter-
mination of whether we are scientifically justified to accept the hypotheses 
on the given evidence". Perhaps Kemeny sees very well the difficulty 
that a TCb-function is needed, because he writes: " ... after investigating 
the content of this formula, Einstein decided that the available evidence 
made it sufficiently probable to accept it" (13). Indeed Kemeny can hardly 
not have seen that the probability in question differs only asymptotically (14) 
from zero. 
If however the above interpretation of Kemeny's text is right, then one 
could wonder why Kemeny does not arrive at the conclusion that Carnap's 
theory fails at this point, a point which is of the greatest importance for 
theoretical science. Indeed if the question on TCb-functions is not resolved, 
Carnap's theory can serve the theoretician only in comparing hypotheses 
with identical absolute probability, and in a few other too limited cases. 
6. The K-function, a proposal for an adequate TCb-function. 
From the results of the preceding section it seems interesting to define 
a new explicatum for' degree of confirmation' which (a) has not the dis-
advantages of the C-function, (b) has all properties for being a good expli-
catum of conf2' and (c) has to be an adequate TCb-function. 
(12) Kemeny in: Schilpp: Carnap, pp. 711-712. 
(13) ibid. p. 712 (italics ours). 
(14) Kemeny introduced asymptotic values for probabilities, in cases where Carnap's 
limit-procedure leads to zero (see below). 
2 
18 D. BATENS 
The author of this article has searched for such a function. The following 
proposal will be referred to as K-function and may in its most intuitive 
form be defined as 
P (e, h) 
K (h, e) = Def. P (e, h) + P (e, it) 
It can be proved that 









This function is thus, as well as the a-functions, a relation between the 
absolute and the relative probability of a hypothesis. It ranges from 1 to 
o and reaches the value of 1/2 in cases where P (h, e) equals P (h), i. e. in 
cases where the hypothesis is neutrally confirmed. In the following section 
its properties will appear more clearly. 
7. Inquiry concerning some more technical problems. 
7.1 The three explicata may be brought in relation with som non-ambi-
guous intuitive notions (15). 
It is easy to prove that, if 
P (h) =f. 0 
P (h) =f. 1 
P (e) =f. 0 
then 
a. verification: 
c (h, e) = 1 == a (h, e) = P (ii) == K (h, e) = 1 
b. confirmation: 
1 > c (h, e) > P (h) == P (it) > a (h, e) > 0 == 1 > K (h, e) > 1/2 
c. neutral confirmation: 
c (h, ~) = P (h) == a (h, e) = 0 == K (h, e) = 1/2 
d. disconfirmation: 
P (h) > c (h, e) > 0 == 0> a (h, e) > - 1 == 1/2 > K (h, e) > 0 
(15) For reasons explained above, deductivism is disregarded here. Consequently the 
c- and C-functions have the same arguments h and e. 
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e. falsification: 
c (h, e) = 0 == C (h, e) = -1 == K (h, e) = 0 
Hence, if it is remarked thar verification means C (h, h) = p (it), it may 
be said that the three functions lead in these cases to analogous results. 
The cases where P (e) = 0 or where h is logically true or false, are not 
important enough to be considered here. In case where his almost-L-true 
or almost-L-false, the K- and the C-functions do not become undefinite but 
lead to values, if a limit is introduced as a limit of C- or K-values and not 
as a limit of P (hi) and P (hi' e) separetely, or if P (h) and P (h, e) are ex-
pressed as asymptotic values. 
The above given scheme stays holding, if it is a little modified. In the 
case of verification e. g., c (h, e) must be really 1 and may not differ asymp-
totically from this value; in the case of confirmation, it suffices that 
I , c (h, e) 1 1m. r.tl (h) > 
which may be the case, even if both tend to zero; a. s, o. In general the 
values of the c-function must be calculated as asymptotic values instead of 
using the limit-procedure. 
The above constations are important for the following points : 
a. the scheme helps to clarify why confl and conf2 are so easily confounded 
in one's intuition. 
b. the C-functions give with respect to conf2 and rCb-functions inade-
quate values in the case of verification; they give inadequate values with 
respect to rCa-functions in the case of neutral confirmation. 
c. the K-function may be a good explicatum for conf2 and an adequate 
member of the class of rCb-functions. 
7.2 Now some other similarities of the C-, C- and K-functions will be re-
garded. 
In case of 
P (hJ = P (h2) 
it can be proved that 
> 
c (hI' el ) - c (h2' e2) < 
is equivalent with 
> 




K (hI' el ) - K (h2' e2) 
< 
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This theorem means that, if two hypotheses with equal m-value are 
compared, then the three explicata lead to the same order, and this even in 
the case each hypothesis is related to a different evidence. The same holds 
a fortiori, if the values of only one hypothesis are compared with respect to 
different evidences. Consequently if a hypothesis reaches a higher degree 
of certainty, then it also receives a higher confirmation-value from a theore-
tical point of view (at least if a C- or the K-function is an adequate TCb-
function). This sets forth an important relation between both groups of 
explicata. 
Comparing the values that the three explicata attribute to structure-
descriptions (as statistical hypotheses), given one or other evidence, one 
will see that in most cases the same order is introduced by the explicata. 
Furthermore in many cases an analogous order is introduced by Fisher's 
likelihood-function (c (e, h». This may explain why acceptable results may 
be reached in statistical practice. 
7.3 There are some remarks to be made about P (h) = 0 and P (h) = 1. 
Indeed there reappears the old problem for the c-function concerning al-
most-L-true and almost-L-false sentences. If the c-function is an adequate 
explicatum for conf1 and an adequate PC-function, then it must have the 
properties of a rational betting-quotient. 
This is a reason to reject the (qualified-) instance-confirmation (16) and 
Hintikka's introduction of the a-parameter (17). Indeed none of them per-
mits to arrive at fair betting-quotients (18). 
Furthermore, it must be objected against the (qualified-) instance-con-
firmation: 
a. it can be used only in case of general hypotheses and not in case of 
statistical ones. 
b. it can be used only in case of hypotheses in L 00; the same hypotheses 
in all LN , with N great enough, will have the same value. 
c. it can be used only in case of not falsified hypotheses; otherwise these 
could receive a value near to 1. 
Hintikka's solution also is hit by the second disadvantage. Furthermore 
it cannot be applied to statistical (non-general) hypotheses that are too 
complex (19). 
(16) cfr. Carnap: Probability, pp. 573 ff. 
(17) Hintikka: in: Hintikka & Suppes: Aspects, p. 133 ff. 
(18) This does not mean that they may not have other uses. 
(19) Too complex are those hypotheses (a) that have as denominator a number greater 
than the N of the L N determined by a, and (b) with, at the same time, a denominator 
indivisible by the numerator. 
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However there is another solution, which seems to be a true one, namely 
that of Kemeny, introducing asymptotic values in the cases of almost-L-true 
and almost-L-false sentences (20). This solution does not seem to have the 
disadvantages of the preceding ones and leads to fair betting-quotients. 
This is a solution for the second group of 'disadvantages' of the c-function. 
7.4 Very clarifying is the examination of quantitative generality. 
Suppose we have a hypothesis hI in L N of the form 
(x) (A (x» 
which is the most confirmed one (in both senses) of the set of hypotheses (21) : 
(x) (p (A (x» = n) (0 ~ n ~ 1) 
Suppose further: 
h2 : the same hypothesis in L N + M 
In this case holds 
a. P (e, hI) = P (e, h2) = 1 
b. P (hI) > P (h2) 
and hence 
c. P (hI.e) = P (hI) 
d. P (hz• e) = P (h2) 
e. P (hI' e) > P (h2• e) 
f. P (h1' e) > P (h2' e) 




from (b), (c) and (d) 
from (e) 
from the definition 
This is in accord with the concept of PC-function. 
Furthermore: 
h. P (e, hI) - P (e) = P (e, h2) - P (e) 
i. P (e, hI) + P ( e) = P (e, h2) + p ( e) 
j. E (hI' e) = E (h2' e) 
k. P (hI' e) P (hI) > P (h2' e) P (h2) 
1. C (h1' e) > C (h2' e) 
from (a) 
from (h) and (i) 
from (b) and (f) 
from (j), (k) and defi-
nition 
m. P (e, hI) - P (e) > P (e, h2) - P (e) 
P (e, hI) + P (e) - P (e. hI) P (e, h2) +P (e) - P (e. h2) 
(20) Kemeny: Measure, pp. 290-293. 
(21) p denotes an objective probability. 
from (h), (i) and (e) 
from (m) and definition, 
22 D. BATENS 
Hence, according to both Popper's C-functions, the most confirmed hypo-
thesis of a set (if it has the above specified form), reaches a lower value 
according as the number of individuals of the language has increased. 
The K-function also has the same property. 
1 1 
o. - 1 < - 1 




. P (hI) P (h2) from (b) 
Both hI and h2 are confirmed. Hence their relative probabilities are 





P (hJ - 1 
1 
1 _ 1 
P (hI' e) 
1+------
1 
P (hI) - 1 













from (r) and definition 
These proofs, which may be supplied by other more general ones, learn 
that the K- and C-functions attribute lower values to (a lot of confirmed) 
hypotheses, according as they speak about numerically greater universes. 
This is a further argument demonstrating, that the C- and K-functions are 
not TCa-functions. Furthermore, it demonstrates that, from this point 
of view the desideratum C (h, h) = P (h) does not help, that quantitatively 
more general hypotheses may reach lower values than others, and stay 
reaching lower values to the moment wherein the less-general hypothesis 
is verified, i. e. to the moment that as many individuals are observed as 
the less-general hypothesis speaks about. The results have also other con-
sequences for some claims of Popper's. However this property of the C 
and K-functions is compatible with conf2 and with the necessary properties 
of TCb-functions. 
7.5 At least as important as the problem of quantitative generality is that 
of qualitative generality. This problem may be taken more generally in this 
sense that, within one single language LN , all hypotheses may be studied 
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with respect to their content. It is a well-known property of the proba-
bility-calculus that 
P (hI' e) ~ P (hI V h2' e) 
In most cases hypotheses with higher content (more-general hypotheses) 
have a lower c-value than hypotheses with higher absolute probability. 
This is a necessary consequence of the concept of rational betting-quotient. 
In most cases C- and K-values become lower, if one passes from well-
confirmed hypotheses with high content to other ones with lower content. 
This is in striking dissimilarity with the case of quantitative generality. 
There are however exceptions to this general trend. Suppose e. g. 
P (e) = 1/2 
P (hI) = 1/8 
P (hI' e) = 1/4 
P (h2) = 1/8 
P (h2' e) = 19/80 
I- (hl .h2) 
in this case (22) : 
C' (hI' e) = 4/11 
C' (h2' e) = 24/71 « 4/11) 
C' (hI V h2' e) = 76/ 197 (> 4/11) 
hence 
C' (hI v h2,e) > C' (hI' e) > C' (h2' e) 
The same holds for the K-values. 
This is an example of the rule that, if two hypotheses have equal or only 
slightly different (positive) C-values, then the disjunction of the hypotheses 
has a higher C-value than each of them. The same holds for the K-func-
tion. 
The fact that, in most cases, well-confirmed hypotheses that are more 
general, reach higher values, seems for conf2 at least acceptable, and fur-
thermore seems for TCb-functions very desirable. Indeed suppose a hypo-
thesis that predicts that a set of facts (SI) will take place and another one 
that predicts that the same set or a definite other one (SI v S2) will take 
place. Now, if (SI) is the case, it seems reasonable to say that the first hy-
pothesis has to reach a higher TCb-value than the latter. 
The cases wherein a disjunction of hypotheses reaches a higher value than 
each of both arguments of the disjunction, could be reconciled with the 
(22) the same holds for the C-function. 
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concept of TCb-functions as follows. If two hypotheses have equally or 
nearly equally the same TCb-value, then it seems better not to conclude 
in favour of one of the two. The fact that the disjunction reaches a higher 
value could be seen as an indication of such cases. 
This explanation may have some plausible aspects. However it must be 
noted, that a very arbitrary factor is involved here, namely the choice of 
a particular TCb-function. Comparing C- and K-values, one can note that 
the cases wherein the mechanism takes place, are not identical for both. 
Even if the C-function is rejected, it is clear that other TCb-functions than 
the K-function may exist, and so the problem remains. 
7.6 A lot of theorems about relations between C- and K-functions can be 
constructed. So for example if: 
then 
P (hI' eI ) 
P (hI) P (eJ 
P (h2• e2) 
P (h2) P (e2) 
Where the implicans is an unequality, the implicatum is substituted by 
some implications. The author of this article did not detect theorems where-
in the C-function became preferable to the K-function, nor theorems that 
might justify the criticised desideratum about maximum-C-values. 
8. Conclusion 
From what precedes it Inay be concluded: 
a. that Popper's deductivism has to be rejected; the following conclusions 
however remain, even if deductivism is not rejected. 
b. that Carnap's c-function may be a good PC-function, but that it is not 
a TC-function. 
c. that Popper's C-functions are neither PC-functions nor TCa-functions, 
and that the K-function is to be preferred as TCb-function. 
d. that it is difficult to evaluate a TCb-function, if the problem of the 
TCa-functions is not resolved. 
A reader, who is not familiar with' inductive logic' (in the widest sense), 
may perhaps get the impression that Carnap's contribution is not very 
important and that, on the other hand, Popper's contribution is very 
defective. He should realise however that the intention of this article was 
not to make a judgment about these contributions~ but only to discuss some 
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problems. Carnap's contribution lays on another level and is as such very 
important, a fortiori while TC-functions cannot at all be applied or even 
judged, if a PC-function is not worked out. On the other hand, it must 
be remarked that Popper's major thesis against the c-function, namely 
that it cannot be a 'confirmation '-function, is a right one, if he means 
that it cannot be a TC-function. 
The author of this article can only hope to have cleared up some points 
in order to help to solve the Carnap-Popper discussion and to open some 
perspectives to the great lot of work that has to be done in inductive logic. 
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